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Pensions of every kind account for the major income sources of a significant part of the 
population. The implications of said income sources are many, three of them are of 
major importance in any society: social effects, granting certain levels of income ensures 
that socially detrimental situations are kept at bay (crime, neighborhood’s decay, 
radicalization of any sort…); granting income sources to specific segments of the society 
fosters consumption, contributing in turn, to the overall economic cycle; last but not 
least, moral effects must be bore in mind too. In Spain, since 2012, contributions are 
outweighed by expenses, creating a deficit that grows wider year after year due to, 
mainly, macroeconomic factors and the very design of the Spanish Pension system, 
despite several modifications, the current system seems to be unfeasible in the long-
run. This work aims at, based on previsions and trends of the main macroeconomic 
variables affecting the pension system computed through a set of econometric models, 
conduct and provide a forecast of both the expected revenues and expected expenses 
of the Spanish Pension System in 2050 to assess whether the system will experience a 
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Pensions of every kind account for the major income sources of a significant part of the 
population; disabled, retirees, widows in some cases and, in average terms, vulnerable 
collectives that exhibit lower income levels than the remaining part of the society. The 
implications of said income sources are many, three of them are of major importance in 
any society: social effects, granting certain levels of income ensures that part of the 
population will be able to enjoy decent or at least acceptable living standards that will 
permeate in society affecting the overall well-being of its citizens and ensuring that 
socially detrimental situations are kept at bay (crime, neighborhood’s decay, 
radicalization of any sort…); economic effects are substantiable too, granting income 
sources to specific segments of the society allows them to conduct certain economic 
activities that otherwise could not, fostering consumption, contributing in turn, to the 
overall economic cycle; last but not least, moral effects must be bore in mind, people 
who are not able to fend for themselves, must be taken care of, no matter the reason 
behind their inability to do by themselves, societies as such  have a duty to fulfill towards 
them, to ensure that they can live with dignity as both citizens and human beings.  
Today, economic and especially demographic variations and shifts threat to jeopardize 
the feasibility of pension systems around the world, burdening even more systems that 
seem to be at the verge of collapse. 
When it comes to pension systems, there exist two main approaches, the Pay as you go 
system, and the fully founded one. Fully founded ones are designed to increase and 
foster two of the tree pillars of the pension system, namely the second and third, “work 
related pension schemes” and “private savings”, at the expense of the first one, “basic 
government pension”; contrarily PAYG system aims to reenforce the first pillar that 
results in weaking the remaining two. PAYG systems entail, therefore a high degree of 
intergenerational solidarity, what makes its functioning greatly dependent upon 
demographic variables. 
The Spanish pension system is found under the umbrella of the social security system, 
that provides other benefits besides pensions; however, 88.62% of social security’s 
resources are devoted to pensions, Seguridad Social. (2021). That is why in this work we 
will address only this component. 
The public pensions system exhibits two different modalities of benefit, basic assistance 
directed towards citizens below a certain income threshold financed via taxes; and 
contributory ones, of compulsory nature financed through the contributions of both 
employers and employees.  
Since the system is conceived as a pay-as-you-go one, intergeneration solidarity is key, 
that is why financing is conducted, mainly, via contributions by both employers and 
employees, and in an ancillary way via public funds come from the national budget and 
 
 
in a marginal way, via private savings and employment pensions schemes (5.3% of the 
total retirement pension Inverco. (2015)). 
Within the system we find two well defined and separate kind of pensions: contributory 
and non-contributory ones. In view of the fact that contributory pensions account for 
91.43% of all pensions, Seguridad Social. (2021), we will not address non-contributive 
pension benefits. 
The revenues to meet the expenses incurred by contributive and non-contributive 
benefits are collected through three main sources, employees’ contribution, accounting 
for 28.104.046.290 Seguridad Social. (2021); employers’ contribution accounting for 
88.245.727.080€ Seguridad Social. (2021) and national budget, currently the amount 
provided directly by the state to finance contributory pensions is 24.417.360.000 
Seguridad Social. (2021). 
The Spanish public pension system has faced and still must face serious demographic 
and macroeconomic challenges and problems, said problems are expected to 
exacerbate seriously under a normal scenario that is without aggravating circumstances 
let alone under a scenario marked by economic crisis and recessions. To face past 
challenges and to face those yet to come, the system has ben is and will be subject to 
structural reforms that are to aim at increasing its resiliency and lifespan. 
The first notorious reform took place in 1985; the minimum contributory period was 
enlarged, shifting from 10 years to 15 years; that is the minimum number of years to be 
eligible for a contributory pension.  
The reform resulting from the “Toledo pact” entered into force in 1997 after being 
entailing an increase in the number of regulatory bases taken into account to determine 
the amount of the pensions, shifting from 8 to 15 years.  
The reform conducted in 2001, allowed early retirement under some circumstances and 
only if the citizen was over the age of 61. 
In 2003 and 2004 two laws were enacted regarding the role and financing of the reserve 
fund. Said laws stipulated that surpluses in contributions were to be devoted to finance 
the fund after the end of each exercise 
New reforms were carried out in 2006, in which eligibility criteria for contributive 
pension, notably disability pensions criteria were stiffened. 
In 2011 new reforms were agreed, retirement minimum age was set on 67, 2 years 
beyond that of the last reform, pensions would be determined based on a contributory 
period of 25 years instead of 15 as previously settled, in order to be eligible for 100% of 
the pension it was required to have contributed 37 years instead of 35. 
During 2013 the most controversial reform took place. The reform modified the way 




The last reform, carried out in 2020 aims to hinder, discourage and reduce the number 
of early retirements by fiscal penalization. The valorization according to CPI was retook 
and the sustainability factor that was supposed to enter into force firstly in 2019 was 
suspended until 2023. 
This work aims to tackle and to expose the problems to be faced by the Spanish pension 
system. Spanish pensions, are arranged within the frame of a so-called fixed benefit 
scheme; clearly belonging to the Pay as you go system scheme. Contrarily to the fixed 
contribution scheme that allows for adjustments of pensions based on the economic 
situation of the country, fixed contribution schemes disassociate the benefit from the 
country’s economic situation. 
To properly analyze the problems in the Spanish pension system and to better fathom 
its feasibility, the expected benefits of the current system as it is today defined will be 
analyzed under different scenarios, those scenarios will include expected variations of 
the most relevant variables considered in the system until 2050. 
Different works already tried to expose possible outcomes conducting estimations of 
the evolution of several macroeconomic factors, some of these works namely Gil et al. 
(2008), Alonso-Meseguer et al. (2005) and Aino Salomäki. (2006) have provided a basic 
framework from which to lay out and conduct this work; which in contrast to the above-
mentioned ones aims exclusively at exposing the impact that of some of the most well-
known macroeconomic variables pose upon the Spanish Pension system as well as at 
providing a forecast of the possible imbalance between revenues and expenses 















Different works have been conducted trying to provide future projections regarding expenditure 
directly related to pensions and social security. Some of them have been considered and have 
provided a good template to conduct this work. 
Within the frame of the Spanish pension system Gil et al. (2008) elaborated a static-
microsimulation model aiming at providing a projection of the pension expenditure during the 
period 2004 – 2050. In this paper the main contributions relate to pensioners’ heterogeneity, 
specifically in terms of pension category, of social security regime, type and gender. The whole 
social security system is addressed in the paper, and it is explicitly linked the projection of 
retirement pensions to the rest of contributory pensions. Difference in pensions based on 
gender are also tackled. According to the study, pensions expenditure will reach its summit in 
2045, afterwards a downward tendency is expected. Expenditure in pensions is mainly driven by 
the evolution in retirement pensions, that are expected to rise in terms of both quantity and 
beneficiaries. Net present values analysis (interest ranging from 3% to 5%) has been conducted 
under different scenarios that modulated productivity growth, migrations, and labor market 
participation over 55 years old; migration flows seem to be the variable that has the greatest 
impact on the projection results.  
Still within the frame of the Spanish pension system Alonso-Meseguer et al. (2005) aimed at 
providing pension expenditure projections under demographic uncertainty. The approach 
follows stochastic population projections to obtain stochastic pension expenditure projections 
for the period 2004 – 2050. Conclusions are interesting provided that they reflect clearly and 
separately revenues and expenditure. It is shown that revenues remain relatively stable related 
to GDP, there is no sharp or dramatic decline and what is more, after 2015 revenues increases; 
the problem exposed is expenditure, baby-boomers retirement will mark the most delicate point 
for the system due to the number of retirees itself but also to the substantial pension they will 
be entitled to, the expense peak is expected by 2040 -2045. The work underlies the deficit 
resulting from this imbalance, which will reach up to 10% of GDP by 2050 by the probability of 
90%, it takes into account as well, the debt resulting from said imbalance which is expected to 
reach between 80% and 280% with an 80% probability. 
Yet within the frame of the Spanish pension system Doménech et al. (2008) using a totally 
different approach tries to provide projections of pension expenditure up to 2060. According to 
the work a key issue is uncertainty and lack of information among citizenship, it is shown how 
that makes it extremely difficult to take unpopular measures that are deemed adequate from 
an economic and empirical point of view. In the work, the aggregate or growth accounting 
approach is used to formulate projections and reach the predictions, the main expenditure 
driving force is the general ageing of the population, mildly attenuated by meager and 
decreasing immigration flows. Conclusions states that Spain must conduct modifications in the 
social security and its financing, deep and far-reaching modifications inspired in those taken by 
countries like Denmark and Sweden; said modifications will be most likely unpopular, however 
the research show that not only are they necessary to long-term sustainability but also that 
through a clear and transparent explanation of the situation and the changes intended, the 
hostility and opposition and consequently, the difficulty towards the implementation of these 
measure could shrink significantly. 
 
 
If we look outside, different works try to tackle the same problem with similar approaches. 
Under the frame of the European Union Aino Salomäki. (2006) reviews the projections of the 
Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission, it takes into account, besides, data 
from each national authority and tries to provide a more in-depth understanding on the 
evolution of projected public pension expenditure.  It analyses the main demographic and 
macroeconomic trends across countries, acknowledging that conclusions, trends and situations 
may vary across countries due to the lack of absolute convergence at economic, political and 
social level. It states that the sensitivity of the systems to macroeconomic and demographic 
shocks varies considerably across countries depending on the design of pension systems. It is 
shown that the projections seem not to be sensitive to higher or lower interest rates as the 
public pensions are not funded in the vast majority of Member States. The conclusions state that 
besides the overall ageing of the European citizenship, the growth rate of wages and the growth 
rate of pensions are growing apart, being the latter the one increasingly more rapidly on a 
regular basis. It remarks the fact that only 4 countries out of the 25 have linked pension growth 
rates to wages growth rates. The paper states that in 2050, pension expenditure will be at its 
peak all over Europe, and that disparities between wages and pensions growth rates could 
exacerbate even more a situation barely sustainable.  
Tackling different OECD countries Bongaarts. (2004) provides forecast of the expected pension 
expenses between 2004-2050 based on the evolution of macroeconomic and demographic 
variables (employment, fertility, dependency ratio, pensioner ratio…). Forecasts of all the 
relevant variables are carried out and used followingly to estimate future pension expenditure 
trends; according to the study, for the countries analyzed, the expense incurred in 2050 if the 
pension system remains unchanged will be unsustainable due to the burden that should be 
incurred on working population to meet this level of expenditure. Several policy proposals are 
presented, the main ones entail reducing overall ageing by fostering fertility and accepting 
immigration at greater scale, reduce social security expenditure by rising the age of retirement 
and reducing pension benefits, and increase labor force participation. As conclusion, the work 
states that in the long run, countries relying on PAYG systems will be forced to undergo some 
serious and in-depth measure since otherwise the expense incurred by pension benefits will 
entail a burden of around 70% of a citizen’s gross wage. None of the proposed solutions are 
oblivious to political consequences and costs, and that could pose extra hindrances. 
Extensive work has been conducted regarding partially capitalized pension systems or multipillar 
ones. Regarding Denmark’s pension system, Jørgen. (2016) exposed the main characteristics of 
the system while enumerating possible threats and future challenges. The paper exposes in 
detail the functioning of the danish system as well as the reforms that It has undergone. 
Conclusions states that despite being more resilient to demographic shocks, the system relies to 
a greater extent than PAYG systems do on financial markets, making it more vulnerable to 
interest variations. Besides, the complexity of the system makes it understandable only to 
experts, excluding the main part of the population, it argues that pension benefits as well as 
benefits stemming from private savings are subject to taxations; since the system varies delays 
retirement age as life expectation increase, health levels vary greatly across income levels it is 
argued that the system exhibits a tendency to polarize the population based on income levels, 





3.Pension Schemes: Structure 
 
Pension systems differ across economies and societies; this diversity relates to different 
cultural, economic and demographic matters; a good way to gain insights is to address 
them from the “three pillars perspective”. 
According to this approach, all systems share a common structure, their differences lie 
only upon which pillar or pillars, they stress, and the fashion they are regulated. OECD. 
(2005). 
 First Pillar: Basic or Universal level, managed entirely by the state, aims 
at ensuring a minimum level of income and a minimum living standard 
for the citizenship. Basic income stemming from the first pillars do not 
differentiate between contributors and non-contributors. First pillar 
benefits rest upon three principles; universal level payment system is 
based on intergenerational solidarity; it is a proportional one, pensions 
are closely related and determined by the level and number of 
contributions each citizen conducts; contributory schemes ensures that 
contributing citizens will be granted higher pensions than non-
contributors while ensuring minimum levels of income for the last ones. 
It is of compulsory nature; that is, its financing is perceived as a 
compulsory saving via taxes and other instruments. 
  
 Second Pillar: Employer’s contributions and work-related pension 
schemes, aimed at raising amounts to complement public pensions. 
Funds raised shall be capitalized and therefore the final amount is always 
subject to financial markets’ behavior. The obligatory nature of these 
contribution varies across nations, and so does its management. 
 
 
 Third Pillar: Private savings, private money devoted to financial assets’ 
purchase like retirement plans and other funds. They are entirely 
voluntary and managed by private sector. 
 
Depending on which of the pillars is fostered, the resulting system is different and so are 
the implications and its resilience and endurance towards macroeconomic shocks. 
There are mainly two paths, either reenforce the role of the state by stressing the first 
pillar, or boosting private income sources by increasing either second or third pillar or 
via a combination of both.  
First pillar’s size increases are likely to reduce both second and third pillar. Extensive 
work has been conducted regarding public pensions and greater benefits implication on 
 
 
private saving and the results are conclusive, those variables are inversely related; even 
though studies on other macroeconomic variables like consumption delivered unclear 
outcomes and inconclusive results, consumption seems to be positively affected by 
increases in first pillar’s income sources Willmore. (2000).  
Increasing the importance of the first pillar leads to the adoption of a Pay-as-you-go 
system, in which contributions of current workers are used to pay current retirees’ 
pensions, it is a system strongly linked to the principle of intergenerational solidarity, 
the state will be in charge of, firstly, collect the required resources to finance benefits 
and pensions, and then, a redistribution will be conducted. In this scenario, the state 
ensures not only basic universal levels of income but also grant contribution-related 
benefits that move away from basic income levels Hernández. (2009). 
o Defined benefit pension schemes: Pension is determined throughout a process 
that takes into account a series of known and fixed variables that ultimately lead 
to a fixed invariable amount. Spain and France are good example of countries 
with said system. OECD. (2005).  
 
o Defined contribution pension schemes: Also known as national account system, 
it takes into account variables that vary in time, that is, the economic 
demographic or political situation in the country can affect differently these 
variables, that is why retirees won’t be able to forecast their future pension with 
full accuracy until retirement. Swedish pension scheme is a good example.  
OECD. (2005). 
 
Increasing second and third pillar’s income sources by either incentives or by a blatant 
reduction of first pillar’s sources reduces the degree of intergenerational solidarity 
required in order the system to thrive; it is argued that, and current facts seem to 
endorse the hypothesis, that systems based on a complementarity of both second and 
third pillar are less vulnerable to demographic shocks, providing greater resiliency to the 
system and the economy Hernández. (2009). These systems follow a capitalization. In 
this scenario the state grants only basic income levels. 
o Fully capitalized system: Main retirees’ income sources stem from the second 
and third pillars. Private investment and employers’ contributions are to be 
enlarged via capital markets; benefits should offset the lack of substantial state 
aid, this particular system is characterized by a reduced role of the state 
regarding pensions. We can find it in E.E.U.U and across the main part of South 
America Tapia, W. (2008). 
 
o Partially capitalized system:  Also known as mixed system and currently one of 
the most widely extended. It is based on the coexistence and complementarity 
of a relatively important first pillar and an equally important second or third one. 
The state should provide a minimum level of income that can include state 
pensions and other benefits, employers may provide in turn resources with 
 
 
which structure a retirement plan, but indeed a key part is made up of private 
savings. It is worth mentioning that first pillar can be structured as a defined 
pension scheme or as a defined contribution one, while keeping the remaining 
pillars unchanged. This system is currently adopted in Germany, the 























4.The Spanish pension system 
 
4.1 The system at a glance 
 
Spanish pension system is structured, today, as a defined benefit scheme “FEDEA. 
(2013)”. It can be found under the umbrella of the social security system, that provides 
other benefits besides pensions; however, 88.62% of social security’s resources are 
devoted to pensions, Seguridad Social. (2021), that is why in this work we will address 
only this component. 
The public pensions system exhibits two different modalities of benefit, basic assistance 
directed towards citizens below a certain income threshold financed via taxes; and 
contributory ones, of compulsory nature financed thanks to the contributions of both 
employers and employees.  
Pension determination in Spain was supposed to include, the so-called “sustainability 
factor”, a set of measures that modify the parameters and variables used to compute 
pensions based on the economic and demographic situation the country find itself in 
2023, that would reshape the current scheme into one of defined contribution; 
currently, this factor is suspended. The system underwent modifications of the variables 
used to determine pensions as well as the criteria to be eligible for one, in other words, 
continuous modifications and reforms are conducted in the system in order to adapt 
pensions and other benefits to the current demographic and economic scenario. 
Since the system is conceived as a pay-as-you-go one FEDEA. (2013), intergeneration 
solidarity is key, that is why financing is conducted, mainly, via contributions by both 
employers (variable amount depending on the nature of the activity and the sector 
centered around 30% of worker’s gross wage) and employees (variable depending on 
the number of extra hours and centered around 6.4% of the gross salary Seguridad 
Social. (2019); in an ancillary way via public funds come from the national budget and in 
a marginal way, via private savings and employment pensions schemes (1.5% of the total 
retirement pension expense Inverco. (2015)). 
Within the system we find two well defined and separate kind of pensions contributory 
and non-contributory ones Seguridad Social. (2021). 
Non-contributory pensions are granted to all those citizens over the age of 65 years not 
having contributed as many years or as much as required to be eligible for a pension and 
perceiving income levels below 5.639,40 € yearly; the age requirement varies when the 
citizen is afflicted with a disability level of 65% or beyond, under this circumstance, the 
solicitor must be under the age of 75 and over the age of 18 years old. Other 
requirements such as residence and nationality must be met as well. Disability can 
include mental health issues. 
 
 
The maximum pension of the kind available for an individual living alone is 5.639 € 
yearly. 
Non-contributory pensions are fully financed by the state via national budget. They 
accounted for roughly 1% of the Spanish GDP in 2019, Seguridad Social. (2019).   
 
4.2 Contributory benefits 
 
Contributory pensions require that the solicitor or the citizen originating the pension be 
or have been an active contributor towards social security during a period of time that 
may vary depending on the benefit solicited. There are different benefits within the 
category. 
Contributory retirement pensions are granted to citizens having contributed up to a 
minimum level and being over a certain age. To be eligible for retirement pension, the 
solicitor must be over the age of 65 years as general rule, yet there are casuistries that 
allow for an early retirement. Pensions cannot exceed or fall short of certain limits. The 
amount of said benefit is determined according to the defined benefit and a 
contributory scheme, that takes into account the labor record of the solicitor. 
Contributory pensions are computed as follow Seguridad Social. (2021): 
1. Contributory Base: The social security contributions conducted up to 24 years 
(288 months) previous to retirement are added together. These contributions 
vary depending on the gross yearly salary. 
 
2. Regulatory Base: The resulting feature is divided by the total number of years 
taken into account multiplied by 14, which is an estimation of the total amount 
of salaries (12 ordinary payments + 2 extra each year). Today, the denominator 
is 336 yet it is likely to increase in the future. The result is the regulatory Base. 
 
3. According to the total number of years contributing the percentage of the 
regulatory base eligible varies, the more years contributed the larger the 
percentage is up to 36 years contributed which grants a 100% of the regulatory 
base. See table 1. 
 
4. Solicitors are allowed to retire before or after the minimum age of 65 years, 
depending on whether they are voluntarily asking for retirement or it is the firm 
that encourage or force them to do so, fiscal reductions and rewards are applied 
in such scenarios. See table 2 and table 3. 
Contributory retirement pensions are, on average substantially greater than non-
contributory ones, being the maximum 37.904,86 € yearly and they accounted for 12.6% 
of SS expenses in 2019, Seguridad Social. (2019).   
 
 
Widow’s pension, are contributory pensions that will be granted to the spouse of a 
deceased citizen should the criteria is met. If the deceased citizen was beneficiary of a 
contributory pension or a disability one or if the citizen has contributed 500 days within 
the last 5 years of life, the spouse will be eligible for said pension Seguridad Social. 
(2021). 
Total disability Pension: benefits of the sort are granted to citizens that have suffered 
accidents, injuries or have undergone medical surgeries or procedures that somehow 
limit their labor capacity making them unable to conduct any labor task. There are 
degrees of disability, partial professional disability, forcing a reduction of the solicitor’s 
activity by a 33%; total professional disability, implying that the solicitor can conduct 
some activities but not its main one or the one in which is currently employed; total 
disability for all job and activity; great disability, when the solicitor requires of other 
people’s help to carry out with its daily live. According to the general regime, the citizen 
will receive a single payment for a partial professional disability, accounting for 24 last 
regulatory bases; for total professional disability, the monthly pension will account for 
55% of the last regulatory base; for total disability for all job and activity, the monthly 
pension will account for 100% of the last regulatory base Seguridad Social. (2021). 
Orphanage pension, benefit granted to the deceased citizen’s offspring under certain 
circumstances. The beneficiary must be below the age of 21, if the beneficiary exhibits 
high levels of disability this criterion is disregarded; should the solicitor has no income 
sources or income sources below the minimum interprofessional salary they age 
criterion would be set below 25 years old. To originate a pension of the sort, the 
deceased citizen must have contributed at least 500 days during the previous 5 years in 
case of being an active member of the social security, in case of not being an active 
member, contribution period will take into account 15 years before passing Seguridad 
Social. (2021). 
 
4.3 Financing sources 
 
Social security financing: 
- Revenues: 
o Employees’ contribution: 
Contributions of both employers and employees are defined and 
stipulated in different regimes of the social security, each regime may 
stipulate the intervals or the percentage with which contributors must 
contribute to the system, regimes are diverse to properly address the 
different nature of the activities and sectors as well as the different kind 
of contracts. We will proceed to explain the general regime.  
Employees will devote a certain percentage of their contributory base; as 
general rule, full-time and part-time employees will devote 4.7% of their 
 
 
regulatory base to social security financing, in addition, 1.55% of it will be 
devoted to social security as unemployment contingency. 
Contributory bases are defined within intervals that takes into account 
only the gross base salary of the worker. These intervals vary depending 
on the nature of the activity and the sector it belongs even within the 
general regime. Currently, social contributions from employees account 




o Employers’ contribution: 
According to the general regime, employers are bound to contribute with 
a certain percentage of employees’ contributory base, as a general rule 
23.60% for social security and 5.5% as unemployment contingency.  
 
Given the importance of self-employed in Spain, a regime stipulates their 
unique features and specifics. According to said regime, they will 
contribute with a 28.3% of the employee’s contributory base. Currently, 
social contributions from employers account for 88.245.727.080€, 
Seguridad Social. (2021).  
See table 7. 
 
o National Budget: 
Progressive and direct contributions of the state of permanent nature 
that reflected and detailed in the general national budged. Furthermore, 
the state is in charge of non-contributory pensions, they are entirely 
financed through special funds channeled directly from the national 
budget, yet the management and administration of said pensions lies 
upon the Autonomous communities. Currently the amount provided 
directly by the state is 31.177.469.000€, from which 7.003.864.540€ are 
to be destined to non-contributory pensions, Seguridad Social. (2021). 
 
4.4 Systems reforms 
 
The Spanish public pension system has faced and still must face serious demographic 
and macroeconomic challenges and problems, said problems are expected to 
exacerbate seriously under a normal scenario, without aggravating circumstances let 
alone under a scenario marked by economic crisis. To face past challenges and to face 
those yet to come, the system has been, is and will be subject to structural reforms that 
aim at increasing its resiliency and lifespan.  
 
 
The first notorious reform took place in 1985 Palier, 2010, p.189; the minimum 
contributory period was enlarged, shifting from 10 years to 15 years. The number of 
contributory bases (years) taken into account varied as well, from 2 to 8 years previous 
to retirement were considered to determine the quantity of the pension.  
The reform resulting from the “Toledo pact” entered into force in 1997. The new reform 
increased the number of regulatory bases taken into account to determine the amount 
of the pensions, shifting from 8 to 15 years, fixed pensions to a revalorization according 
to the evolution of the CPI and eliminated the thresholds that once could hinder 
contributions below the maximum. Besides, a reserve fund was created as to offer some 
financial relief in case of the social security finding itself in a plight. The very same Toledo 
pact stipulated that revisions must be conducted after 5 years Hernández et al. (2017). 
The reform conducted in 2001 allowed early retirement under some circumstances and 
only if the citizen was over the age of 61; the reform aimed at ensuring and encouraging 
retirement beyond the age of 67 via fiscal incentives Hernández et al. (2017). 
In 2003 and 2004 two laws were enacted regarding the role and financing of the reserve 
fund. Said laws stipulated that surpluses in contributions were to be devoted to finance 
the fund after the end of each exercise that is after having satisfied all Social security’s 
expenses Hernández et al. (2017). 
As result of the revision of the pacts in 2003, new reforms were carried out in 2006, said 
modifications encompassed the alterations of the contributory bases taken into 
account, from that reform on, the computation would be conducted based on the 
effective contributed days up to 15 effective years. Partial retirement was allowed at 
the age of 61 only if the solicitor could prove 30 years of contribution. Eligibility disability 
pension criteria were stiffened Hernández et al. (2017). 
In 2011 new reforms were agreed, said reforms entered into force in 2013. Again, 
retirement minimum age was set on 67, 2 years beyond that of the last reform, pensions 
would be determined based on a contributory period of 25 years not 15 as previously 
settled, in order to be eligible for 100% of the pension it was required to have 
contributed 37 not 35. Before long, in 2013 a new law, complemented this reform, 
aiming at increasing citizenship’s proneness towards working beyond the minimum 
retirement age by increasing fiscal incentives, last but not least, early retirement 
requirements were stiffened and the age in which solicitors could apply for it increased 
Hernández et al. (2017). 
During 2013 the most controversial reform took place. The reform modified the way 
pensions were revalorized, while the revalorization could not be below 0.25% nor over 
0.50% over CPI’s increase, they were no longer subject to the CPI, revalorization was 
conducted based on a formula linking revenues and expenses of the social security 
system. Furthermore, a new variable was used to compute pensions, the so-called 
sustainability factor was supposed to enter into force in 2019, it would relate the initial 
pension with the life expectancy over the age of 67, the factor would be subject to 
supervision and should it be necessary, modified every 5 years. This reform de facto 
 
 
turned the Spanish pension system from a defined benefit scheme into a defined 
contribution one Hernández et al. (2017). 
The last reform, carried out in 2020 aimed to hinder, discourage and reduce the number 
of early retirements by fiscal penalizations, 2% will be subtracted directly to the 
regulatory base if the solicitor contributed at least 38.5 years, the reduction decreases 
as the number of years contributed increased, reaching the minimum reduction, 
1.625%, when contributing 44.5 years for each trimester until the solicitor reaches 67 
years old. Said reform retook the valorization according to CPI and suspended the 
sustainability factor that was supposed to enter into force firstly in 2019, and after a 



















5.Data and Sources 
 
To properly conduct this work, 30 different variables have been selected and assessed, 
all of them numerical and continuous.  
Dependent variables: 
Expenses: Expenses incurred in the social security system. Ranged from 1995 to 2021, 
expressed in € thousands; extracted from the Spanish Social security website.  
Revenues: Revenues of the social security system. Ranged from 1995 to 2021, expressed 
in € thousands; extracted from the Spanish Social security website.  
Independent variables: 
Number of pensioners: Citizens entitled to a pension. Ranged from 1995 to 2020, 
expressed in individual units; extracted from the Spanish Social security website. 
Average pension: Average pension to which citizens are entitled. Ranged from 1995 to 
2020, expressed in units of euros; extracted from the Spanish Social security website. 
Average effective retirement age: Average age at which citizens decide to retire. Ranged 
from 2005 to 2020, expressed in years; extracted from the Spanish Social security 
website. 
Life expectancy: Average period citizens are expected to live. Ranged from 1995 to 2019, 
expressed in years; extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
NAWRU: Non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment, measure of structural 
unemployment. Ranged from 1995 to 2021, expressed in percentage units; extracted 
from the European commission’s database. 
Number of contributors: Number of citizens devoting part of their gross wage to social 
security. Ranged from 1999 to 2020, expressed in individual units; extracted from the 
Spanish Social security website. 
Number of firms: Number of firms existing in Spain. Ranged from 1999 to 2020, 
expressed in years; extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Average wage: Mean of official perceived wages in Spain. Ranged from 2000 to 2019, 
expressed in units of euro; extracted from the OECD’s database. 
Auxiliar Independent variables: 
Health public expenditure: Public resources devoted to health services. Ranged from 




Net average income per capita: Yearly income perceived on average by citizens, measure 
of structural unemployment. Ranged from 2008 to 2019, expressed in units of euro; 
extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Total population: Number people officially living in Spain. Ranged from 1996to 2020, 
expressed in individual units; extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Dependency ratio: Age-population ratio of those individuals not in the labor force and 
those in the labor force. Ranged from 1995 to 2020, expressed percentage units; 
extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Mortality ratio: Ratio of yearly deceased individuals and the whole of the population. 
Ranged from 1995 to 2020, expressed percentage units; extracted from the National 
Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Average income per consumption unit: Household income devoted to each unit of 
consumption. Ranged from 2008 to 2019, expressed in units of euro; extracted from the 
National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Replacement rate: Percentage of a worker's pre-retirement income that is paid out by a 
pension program upon retirement. Ranged from 2008 to 2018, expressed percentage 
units; extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
GDP growth: Yearly variation in GDP size. Ranged from 1995 to 2019, expressed in 
percentage units; extracted from the World Bank’s database. 
Expected working life: Average years individuals will devote to official work. Ranged 
from 2000 to 2019, expressed in years; extracted from the Eurostat’s data base. 
Average contribution: Average contribution conducted by individuals. Ranged from 
2000 to 2019, expressed in units of euro; extracted from the Spanish Labor and work 
ministry’s web page. 
Demand expectations: Survey encompassing both consumers and producers’ 
expectations regarding the economic situation. Ranged from 1999 to 2020, expressed in 
score units; extracted from the Spanish National Bank (Banco de España). 
Foreign direct investment: Amount of foreign capital devoted to investment in Spain. 
Ranged from 2005 to 2020, expressed in units of U.S dollar; extracted from the OECD’s 
database. 
Activity rate: Proportion of the population, both employed and unemployed, that 
constitutes the labor force supply of the labor market. Ranged from 2002 to 2020, 
expressed percentage units; extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Average population age: Mean of the age of individuals. Ranged from 1999 to 2020, 
expressed in years; extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
 
 
Fertility rate: Average number of children that would be born to a woman over her 
lifetime. Ranged from 1999 to 2020, expressed in child per women; extracted from the 
National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Productivity per hour: Amount of GDP produced in an hour of work. Ranged from 1999 
to 2020, expressed in units of U.S dollars; extracted from the OECD’s database. 
Proportion of full-time workers: Relationship between full-time workers over the total 
employed individuals. Ranged from 2002 to 2020, expressed in percentage units; 
extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Proportion of tertiary educated individuals: Proportion of individuals with college 
education or equivalent with respect the total individuals. Ranged from 1999 to 2019, 
expressed in percentage units; extracted from the OECD’s database. 
Early school leaving: People aged 18 to 24 who leave education and training without 
attaining upper secondary qualification or equivalent. Ranged from 2004 to 2019, 
expressed in percentage units; extracted from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
Competitive index: Measure (100 max, 0 min) of competitivity. Ranged from 2007 to 
2019, expressed in score units; extracted from the World Bank’s database. 
Logistics index: Measure (5 ma, 0 min) of infrastructure development. Ranged from 2007 
to 18 expressed in score units; extracted from the World Bank’s database. 
Households’ consumption: Mean of official perceived wages in Spain. Ranged from 1999 

















In order to conduct the quantitative analysis, two main econometric models have been 
used: ARIMA models and Linear Regression ones. 
Independent variables, “Expenses” and “Revenues” have been analyzed in order to 
foresee their value in 2050 and to be able to forecast future imbalances. To accurately 
forecast said values, 8 important macroeconomic variables have been considered, which 
in turn, are analyzed through a set of 22 auxiliar variables that aim to provide a greater 
value of precision to the forecasts.  
Linear regression models have been used to forecast the 2050 value of the 22 auxiliar 
variables (Z). Based on the forecasts, ARIMA models have been used to conduct the 
forecasts of the 8 macroeconomic variables (X) in 2050, which in turn, have been utilized 
to provide forecast through ARIMA processes of the main two variables (Y) “Expenses” 
and “Revenues” which have been expressed as intervals of possible future values. 
Computation and statistical modelling have been conducted with Stata and Rstudio 
software. 
Linear regression attempts to model the relationship between two or more variables by 
fitting a linear equation to observed data. One variable is considered to be an 
explanatory variable (Y), and the others are considered to be a dependent variable (X). 
Dependent variables are therefore explained as a function of independent variables: 
𝑦 =𝛽 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑥 + ⋯ + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑥 + 𝜀   
Linear models are simple, easy to use predictors and estimation tools yet they exhibit 
several shortcomings (limitation to linear relationships or sensitivity to outliers). 
The Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model operate with time series 
or even panel data series and aims at considering autoregressive features and factors 
the data could exhibit to provide accurate estimators. It combines the differenced 
autoregressive model with the moving average one. It is expressed as: 
𝑦 𝑡 = 𝐼 + 𝛼 𝑦 + ⋯ + 𝛼 𝑦 + 𝛽 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑥 + 𝑒 + 𝜃 𝑒 + ⋯ + 𝜃 𝑒  
Where 𝑦  represents the past values (one period ago) of y, the dependent variable; 
and 𝜃 𝑒  represents the past error (one period ago) of the regression. 
ARIMA (p,d,q) models entail 3 paramount factors, the AR (autoregressive) part which 
shows up to which period “p” (lag) the time series is regressed on its own past data; the 
MA (moving average) part which  indicates up to which period “q” (lag) the error is a 
linear combination of past respective errors; and the degree of integration I which shows 
the order of the differenced values “d” that has been used to replace the data values in 





E1: Expenses | Nº Retirees  
 pensionbenefits  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
retirees 36.975 4.08 9.06 0 28.979 44.97 *** 
Constant -82603178 21243482 -3.89 0 -1.242e+08 -40966719 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 100917820.225 SD dependent var   31683496.550 
Number of obs   26 Chi-square   82.142 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 924.215 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E1: Expenses | Average Pension  
 pensionbenefits  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
averagepension 163570.91 16375.322 9.99 0 131475.86 195665.95 *** 
Constant -8976730.4 9308852.8 -0.96 .335 -27221747 9268285.9  
L .857 .16 5.36 0 .543 1.17 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 100917820.225 SD dependent var   31683496.550 
Number of obs   26 Chi-square   99.957 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 877.290 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E1: Expenses | Effective Retirement Age  
 D.pensionbenefits  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
D 11814660 1969465.3 6.00 0 7954579.2 15674741 *** 
Constant 5964105.4 1363740.4 4.37 0 3291223.3 8636987.4 *** 
L .64 .142 4.52 0 .362 .918 *** 
L .732 .158 4.62 0 .422 1.043 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5806343.841 SD dependent var   2812681.891 
Number of obs   15 Chi-square   123.111 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 477.962 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E1: Expenses | Life Expectancy  
 pensionbenefits  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
lifeexpectancy 16171866 875346.74 18.47 0 14456218 17887514 *** 
Constant -1.212e+09 70856794 -17.10 0 -1.350e+09 -1.073e+09 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 98248019.906 SD dependent var   29199748.078 
Number of obs   25 Chi-square   341.319 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 865.158 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
E2: Revenues | Nº contributors, Avg Wage  
 Revenues  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
contributors 10.777 1.307 8.25 0 8.216 13.338 *** 
averagewage 10561.063 2085.178 5.06 0 6474.189 14647.937 *** 
Constant -3.819e+08 60893040 -6.27 0 -5.012e+08 -2.625e+08 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 95910136.427 SD dependent var   16874716.374 
Number of obs   20 Chi-square   94.962 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 692.850 
 
 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2: Revenues | NAWRU  
 Revenues  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
nawru -4645365 1390163 -3.34 .001 -7370034.4 -1920695.7 *** 
Constant 1.616e+08 30176364 5.36 0 1.025e+08 2.208e+08 *** 
L 1.694 .151 11.20 0 1.398 1.991 *** 
L2 -.712 .151 -4.70 0 -1.008 -.415 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 89078465.798 SD dependent var   25631741.580 
Number of obs   27 Chi-square   4879.146 
Prob > chi2  0.001 Akaike crit. (AIC) 894.731 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2: Revenues | Nº contributors  
 Revenues  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
contributors 6.713 1.681 3.99 0 3.419 10.007 *** 
Constant -23968828 36477806 -0.66 .511 -95464013 47526357  
L .978 .012 81.76 0 .955 1.002 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 95168621.403 SD dependent var   19135335.665 
Number of obs   22 Chi-square   7415.327 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 736.323 




E2: Revenues | Nº firms  
 Revenues  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
numberoffirms 61.742 10.266 6.01 0 41.622 81.862 *** 
Constant -96289640 32381316 -2.97 .003 -1.598e+08 -32823427 *** 
L .821 .237 3.47 .001 .357 1.285 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 95168621.403 SD dependent var   19135335.665 
Number of obs   22 Chi-square   248.810 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 723.307 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2: Revenues | Avg Wage  
 Revenues  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
averagewage 10471.133 2898.562 3.61 0 4790.055 16152.21 *** 
Constant -1.918e+08 81385360 -2.36 .018 -3.513e+08 -32243069 ** 
 
Mean dependent var 95910136.427 SD dependent var   16874716.374 
Number of obs   20 Chi-square   13.050 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 720.801 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
The different variables combinations stem from the need of avoiding collinearity 
problems, and, in addition, provides an interesting path to obtain a range of expected 
future values for the two main variables assessed.  
Additional models and estimations of the independent variables used in the before 





The analysis previously conducted shed some light upon the future expected values of 
both expenses and revenues of the Spanish Pension System; as explained an interval 
have been constructed in order to encompass different possible scenarios and thus 
different values for both variables.  
Equation 1: Expenses incurred by the Spanish Pension System in 2050: 
 Expenses: [84514669, 796231489] thousand euros; predictions’ mean: 
354,747,105 thousand euros. 
Independent variables (X) 2050 forecast: 
 Life expectancy: [80.1, 80.5] years old; predictions’ mean: 80.3 years old. 
 Number of pensioners: 15,586,918 individuals. 
 Average retirement age: 66.88 years old. 
 Average pension: [1716,1943] euros per month; predictions’ mean: 1,830 euros 
monthly. 
 
Equation 2: Revenues of the Spanish Pension System in 2050: 
 Revenues: [32286715, 456786702] thousand euros; predictions’ mean: 
167,597,808 thousand euros. 
Independent variables (X) 2050 forecast: 
 NAWRU: [11.5, 14.35] percent (%); predictions’ mean: 12.95%. 
 Number of contributors: [19315788, 43723826] individuals; predictions’ mean: 
21,769,300 individuals. 
 Average wage: [1341, 25256] euros yearly; predictions’ mean: 9,148 euros 
yearly. 
 Number of firms: [2082478, 2213714] firms; predictions’ mean: 2,148,095 firms. 
 
The analysis allows us to use the mean of both expected expenses and revenues so as 
to forecast the state of Spanish Pension System’s balance; according to the 
computations; in 2050, the system will experience a deficit of 187,149,297 thousand 
euros. The quantitative study shows that the unbalances that initially took place in 2012 
will grow wider and that expenses will substantially outweigh revenues if all 
macroeconomic variables follow the current tendency and if no changes or 
modifications in the current system are conducted. In 2021 the deficit is estimated to be 
of 42,197,429 thousand euros; in 2050 the deficit will be almost four times and a half 





Pensions of every kind account for the major income sources of a significant part of the 
population. The implications of said income sources are many, three of them are of 
major importance in any society: social effects, granting certain levels of income ensures 
that socially detrimental situations are kept at bay (crime, neighborhood’s decay, 
radicalization of any sort…); granting income sources to specific segments of the society 
fosters consumption, contributing in turn, to the overall economic cycle; last but not 
least, moral effects must be bore in mind too. In Spain, since 2012, contributions are 
outweighed by expenses, creating a deficit that grows wider year after year due to, 
mainly, macroeconomic factors and the very design of the Spanish Pension system, 
despite several modifications, the current system seems to be unfeasible in the long-
run. In this work the main macroeconomic variables affecting or having major influence 
on the system have been analyzed and their expected value forecasted, based on these 
previsions and trends computed through linear regression models and ARIMA models, 
a plausible and accurate forecast of both the expected revenues and expenses of the 
Spanish Pension System in 2050 have been provided. The results seem conclusive, in 
2050 the deficit will have grown 440% compared to that of today if all factors behave as 
predicted and no further changes or modifications on the pension system are 
conducted. Indeed, the values obtained are compelling and totally discouraging for 
those clinging to the system as it is designed today. To reach a well-balanced system two 
paths are possible and feasible, it is required to either increase revenues or decrease 
the overall expense of the system, of course the perfect solution would entail a middle 
point in which expenses decrease and revenues increase.  
Reduce expenses is a must, yet we have to bear in mind the moral and distributional 
effects that said objective would entail. 
According to the results obtained, the three key variables to be dealt with when tackling 
the system’s expenses are: Average pension benefit, average retirement age and the 
total number of pensioners. Since it is not possible to remove active contributors from 
the system i.e it is totally unfeasible to deprive someone of his future pension after 
having actively contributed to the system, no suggestions will be made on that front. It 
would be wise, however, to reduce the benefits to which contributors are entitled, as 
well as stiffening the criteria in order for a contributor to be fully entitled to a pension. 
It is advisable not to reduce all pensions or stiffening all criteria homogenously since by 
so doing, lower income deciles would be bearing as much burden as upper income ones. 
The cut and stiffening should be progressively conducted and based on the contribution, 
by the same token, increasing the minimum age at which retirement is available, which 
is paramount to attain the sufficient reduction in the expense level, should not be 
homogenous either, workers in jobs or sectors that entail a certain level of physical 
effort, which are normally subject to lower salaries, should not experience any forced 
increase in their working life. Fiscal measures and incentives must be designed in order 
 
 
to retain as many individuals in the workforce and to enlengthen their working life as 
much as possible, always according to a cost-benefit analysis, since said incentive would 
most certainly entail an expense in turn. 
According to the results obtained the most efficient way to boost revenues would be to 
reduce unemployment while increasing both average wage and number of firms. 
Indeed, combining increases in wages and unemployment reduction would be only 
attainable through a general productivity increase, which, given the current situation 
ant trends, seems unlikely; forcibly rising wages could trigger an increase in 
unemployment therefore proving to be counterproductive since unemployment is, 
according to the results, more relevant from the point of view of revenue sources than 
wage levels are. Reductions in unemployment rate however would alleviate the 
situation of the whole social security not only the contributory pension system since less 
unemployment benefits would be required and more active contributors would be 
lifting the amount of revenues up, unemployment reduction is therefore paramount due 
to its double role. The number of firms operating has a positive effect on the amount of 
revenues, and again, increasing the number of firms would exhibit a double role, it 
would help keeping unemployment at bay or even reducing it and would contribute as 
an entity to the system. The optimal strategy would help firms proliferate, appear and 
settle in Spain, fiscal and other incentive could be used following always a cost-benefit 
analysis, an interesting strategy would be tackling the current level of administrative 
bureaucracy in order to ease and facilitate procedures and legal requirements for 
business and enterprises formation as much as possible. The core strategy should be 
attracting and facilitate the creations of new enterprises that would employ a greater 
amount of the labor force, that would shift from being a burden to the system to a pillar 
upon which to rest. If this strategy is combined with the appropriate management of 
economic policies to channel and encourage investment toward productive sectors and 
activities the effects would most certainly be greater and more notorious. 
Combining a measured, fair and reflected reduction in the number of benefits bestowed, 
with an efficient administrative and fiscal reform endorsed by minor specific policies it 
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Source: Instituto BBVA de pensiones. (2020, October 16). Cálculo de la pensión: bases de 
cotización, base reguladora, ajuste por años de cotización. Directly extracted. 
 
Table 4, Full-time workers: 
 






Table 5, Part-time workers: 
 
 
Source: Seguridad Social. (2019). Bases y tipos de cotización 2019. Directly extracted. 
 



















All ARIMA models are of own creation and have been specifically designed and 
conducted for this work. 
 
Equation 1: Pension System’s Expenses. 
E1.1: Retirees | Total Population, Dependency ratio, Mortality rate  
 retirees  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
dependencyratio 21160.48 190143.44 0.11 .911 -351513.82 393834.78  
mortalityrate 90688.063 206036.78 0.44 .66 -313136.61 494512.73  
population .254 .222 1.15 .252 -.181 .69  
Constant -8127316.5 1349822.5 -6.02 0 -10772920 -5481712.9 *** 
L 1.74 .376 4.63 0 1.003 2.477 *** 
L2 -.91 .144 -6.34 0 -1.192 -.629 *** 
L -1 0 -
7674.30 
0 -1 -.999 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 4985575.333 SD dependent var   712517.461 
Number of obs   24 Chi-square   195481239.522 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 656.701 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E1.2: Avg Pension | GDP Growth rate, Expected working life  
 averagepension  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
growthrate -.547 .511 -1.07 .285 -1.548 .454  
expectedworkinglif
e 
120.535 3.872 31.13 0 112.946 128.124 *** 
Constant -3250.852 127.008 -25.60 0 -3499.782 -3001.922 *** 
L 1.538 .103 14.95 0 1.337 1.74 *** 
L2 -.869 .087 -9.95 0 -1.041 -.698 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 744.788 SD dependent var   167.211 
Number of obs   20 Chi-square   1765.622 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 147.797 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E1.2: Avg Pension | GDP Growth rate, Expected contribution  
 averagepension  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
growthrate -6.514 12.111 -0.54 .591 -30.252 17.223  
averagecontributio
~e 
.522 .19 2.75 .006 .15 .894 *** 
Constant -70.733 297.615 -0.24 .812 -654.048 512.583  
 
Mean dependent var 731.527 SD dependent var   160.627 
Number of obs   19 Chi-square   160.431 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 234.425 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 




 Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
averageincomeperc
o~t 
0 0 -0.10 .923 0 0  
replacementrate 3.096 .349 8.88 0 2.413 3.78 *** 




Mean dependent var 64.031 SD dependent var   0.232 
Number of obs   11 Chi-square   91.243 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) -13.274 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E1.4: Life expectancy | Public health expenditure  
 lifeexpectancy  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
healthexpenditure 0 0 1.42 .157 0 0  
Constant 80.531 .422 190.93 0 79.705 81.358 *** 
L 1.98 .008 259.13 0 1.965 1.995 *** 
L2 -1 0 -
2068.67 
0 -1.001 -.999 *** 
L -1.949 .022 -87.85 0 -1.993 -1.906 *** 
L2 1 0 4083.32 0 .999 1 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 81.826 SD dependent var   1.257 
Number of obs   18 Chi-square   523506172.294 
Prob > chi2  0.157 Akaike crit. (AIC) 10.492 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E1.4: Life expectancy | Net average income per capita  
 lifeexpectancy  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
netaverageincome
pe~n 
0 0 0.86 .387 0 .001  
Constant 80.171 2.519 31.82 0 75.233 85.109 *** 
L 1.929 .07 27.44 0 1.791 2.067 *** 
L2 -.965 .041 -23.49 0 -1.045 -.884 *** 
L -1 0 -
236092.
88 
0 -1 -1 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 82.577 SD dependent var   0.676 
Number of obs   12 Chi-square   4516796910078.71
9 
Prob > chi2  0.387 Akaike crit. (AIC) 14.971 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
Equation 2: Pension System’s Revenuess. 
E2.1: NAWRU | Consumers Expectations, Foreign direct investment  
 nawru  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
consumersexpectat
i~s 
-.006 .004 -1.67 .096 -.013 .001 * 
fdi 0 0 -3.53 0 0 0 *** 
Constant 15.458 .199 77.60 0 15.068 15.849 *** 
L 1.89 .018 106.05 0 1.855 1.925 *** 
L2 -1 0 -
4661.81 
0 -1 -.999 *** 
L -1.938 .033 -59.15 0 -2.002 -1.874 *** 
L2 1 .001 1059.67 0 .998 1.002 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 15.531 SD dependent var   1.465 
Number of obs   16 Chi-square   162367289.337 
Prob > chi2  0.002 Akaike crit. (AIC) 17.578 





E2.1: NAWRU | Producers Expectations, Foreign direct investment  
 nawru  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
producersexpectati
~s 
-.005 .009 -0.55 .582 -.023 .013  
fdi 0 0 -2.49 .013 0 0 ** 
Constant 15.633 .259 60.45 0 15.126 16.14 *** 
L 1.855 .032 58.48 0 1.793 1.917 *** 
L2 -.987 .012 -81.23 0 -1.011 -.963 *** 
L -1 0 -
314470.
89 
0 -1 -1 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 15.531 SD dependent var   1.465 
Number of obs   16 Chi-square   171491554490.442 
Prob > chi2  0.039 Akaike crit. (AIC) 19.379 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2.2: Nº Contributors | Total Population  
 contributors  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
population .337 .078 4.33 0 .184 .489 *** 
Constant 2268287.2 3438402.4 0.66 .509 -4470857.6 9007432  
 
Mean dependent var 17351724.545 SD dependent var   1312960.884 
Number of obs   22 Chi-square   18.789 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 676.292 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2.2: Nº Contributors | Activity rate, Fertility rate, Avg Age  
 contributors  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
activityrate 92276.69 129670.41 0.71 .477 -161872.64 346426.02  
fertilityrate -3201967.6 3172721.4 -1.01 .313 -9420387.3 3016452.2  
averageage 13449.576 159176.06 0.08 .933 -298529.78 325428.93  
Constant 15787655 7750800.6 2.04 .042 596364.94 30978945 ** 
L 1.717 .027 63.52 0 1.664 1.77 *** 
L2 -.997 .002 -475.00 0 -1.001 -.993 *** 
L -1.947 .02 -97.94 0 -1.986 -1.908 *** 
L2 1 .001 1577.65 0 .999 1.001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 17626099.556 SD dependent var   1020302.406 
Number of obs   18 Chi-square   4484827999.148 
Prob > chi2  0.001 Akaike crit. (AIC) 515.522 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2.3: Nº firms | Competitiveness index, Logistics index  
 numberoffirms  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
scorecompetitiven
ess 
29969.663 10769.603 2.78 .005 8861.629 51077.697 *** 
scoorelogistics -502777.52 163958.97 -3.07 .002 -824131.19 -181423.85 *** 
Constant 2980205.4 986954.51 3.02 .003 1045810.1 4914600.7 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3263792.833 SD dependent var   90956.713 
Number of obs   12 Chi-square   17.389 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 301.899 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2.3: Nº firms | Competitiveness index, Households Consumption  





25919.678 5509.479 4.70 0 15121.297 36718.059 *** 
householdsconsu
mpt~n 
761.32 181.579 4.19 0 405.432 1117.207 *** 
Constant 801545.94 401818.27 1.99 .046 13996.607 1589095.3 ** 
 
Mean dependent var 3271439.308 SD dependent var   91344.338 
Number of obs   13 Chi-square   49.764 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 324.170 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2.4: Avg wage | GDP growth rate, Productivity per hour, Full-time workers  
 averagepension  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
growthrate -.608 .287 -2.12 .034 -1.171 -.046 ** 
offulltimeworkers -1.777 .948 -1.87 .061 -3.636 .081 * 
prodperc -.426 .031 -13.75 0 -.487 -.365 *** 
Constant 987.486 260.984 3.78 0 475.966 1499.005 *** 
L 1.973 .014 145.46 0 1.946 1.999 *** 
L2 -.977 .014 -69.39 0 -1.005 -.949 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 774.047 SD dependent var   148.876 
Number of obs   18 Chi-square   191892.751 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 137.897 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2.4: Avg wage | GDP growth rate, Population with third level education  
 averagepension  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
growthrate -2.964 1.086 -2.73 .006 -5.093 -.835 *** 
ofpopwithtertiarye
~n 
33.425 2.614 12.78 0 28.301 38.549 *** 
Constant -277.307 80.214 -3.46 .001 -434.523 -120.09 *** 
L 1.719 .18 9.54 0 1.366 2.073 *** 
L2 -.892 .094 -9.52 0 -1.075 -.708 *** 
L -1 0 -
266857.
60 
0 -1 -1 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 730.580 SD dependent var   175.501 
Number of obs   21 Chi-square   143317580529.891 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 173.999 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
E2.4: Avg wage | GDP growth rate, Productivity per hour, Early school leaving  
 averagepension  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
growthrate -8.661 2.479 -3.49 0 -13.521 -3.802 *** 
ofearlyabandonem
en~o 
-22.418 2.035 -11.01 0 -26.408 -18.429 *** 
prodperc -.016 .47 -0.03 .973 -.937 .905  
Constant 1382.845 45.062 30.69 0 1294.525 1471.165 *** 
L 1 0 94715.8
8 
0 1 1 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 804.428 SD dependent var   127.392 
Number of obs   16 Chi-square   12519161964.757 
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC) 153.464 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
